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In roughly the last 50 years, the Ecuadorian Amazon has become the epicenter of petroleum 
production in Ecuador. As oil companies attempt to exploit more and more of the rainforest, they 
have encroached on indigenous lands, leading to violations of indigenous rights through 
environmental destruction. As their territories have been invaded, indigenous groups throughout 
the Amazon have formed movements large and small in resistance to petroleum activities. 
Scholars have studied select campaigns in the past, but the literature lacks a comparative review 
of the characteristics of those movements. This paper compiles histories of seven campaigns 
against petroleum in the Ecuadorian Amazon and compares them, focusing on analyzing the 
tactics groups used and the level of success they found. Results are inconclusive but uncover 
anecdotal similarities between Ecuadorian movements and those in other countries and open 
possibilities for future, more definitive research in this field.  
Keywords: ​indigenous social movements, Ecuador Amazon, petroleum, movement tactics 
 
Resumen 
Durante los últimos 50 años, la Amazonía ecuatoriana se ha convertido en el epicentro de la 
producción de petróleo en el país. A medida que las empresas petroleras continúan explotando 
más y más la selva, han invadido territorios indígenas, dando lugar a violaciones de derechos tras 
destrucción del medio ambiente. A medida que sus territorios han sido invadidos, grupos 
indígenas de la selva han formado movimientos grandes y pequeños en resistencia a las 
actividades petroleras. Algunos académicos han realizado estudios sobre estos movimientos, 
pero la literatura carece de un resumen comparativo de las características de esos movimientos. 
Este ensayo recopila las historias de siete campañas contra el petróleo en la Amazonía 
ecuatoriana y las compara, enfocando en analizar las tácticas que usaron los grupos y el nivel de 
éxito que tuvieron. Los resultados no son concluyentes pero ellos descubren similitudes 
anecdóticas entre los movimientos ecuatorianos y los de otros países y abren posibilidades para 
estudios futuros y más definitivos en este área.  
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A Brief History of Petroleum in Ecuador 
Exploitation of petroleum in Ecuador began as early as 1920, from small deposits near 
the coast (Wilkins, 1974). At this time, Ecuador was already anticipating oil being a significant 
player in its economy (Rochlin, 2011). However, the discovery of vast amounts of oil in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon was not announced until 1967, and 1972 was the year that oil began flowing 
in earnest, a change that would create Ecuador’s world status as an oil-producing country as well 
as shape its economy, environment, and social landscape for decades to come (Martz, 1987). 
From 1964-1992, Texaco (later bought by Chevron) was active in the Northern Amazon in 
Ecuador and committed what would come to be known by activists and the plaintiffs suing the 
company for their damage (known as “los afectados”) as the “Amazon Chernobyl” (​Summary of 
Part One​, 2011). There is extensive evidence that Texaco deliberately engaged in extraction 
techniques that had been obsolete for years due to their environmentally destructive effects in 
order to marginally increase their profits (Amazon Watch, 2012). Chevron’s own lawyer 
admitted the company had dumped at least 16 billion gallons of toxic wastewater into water 
sources that indigenous peoples depend on for their daily lives (​Summary of Overwhelming 
Eviden​ce, 2012). The court that first tried the case in Ecuador also found that Texaco left more 
than 900 unlined, uncovered pits of oil sludge, which leaked into surrounding soil and water, 
resulting in numerous disastrous effects to the health and livelihoods of residents of the area 
(​Summary of Overwhelming Eviden​ce, 2012). Their initial transgressions become barely the tip 
of the iceberg when looking at the following years of corruption and fraud the company engaged 
in as they fought tooth and nail against being held accountable.  
But Texaco-Chevron’s actions in the North of the Amazon in Ecuador were only the 
beginning. In the decades following the discovery of oil in the Amazon, Ecuador’s economy had 
become heavily dependent on petroleum production. The government had become ensnared in a 
loan with China that required them to repay their debt in petroleum, compelling Ecuador to open 
up block after block of the Amazon rainforest to oil companies from around the world (Casey & 
Krauss, 2018). After hearing from their neighbors in the North of the destruction caused by 
Texaco-Chevron, indigenous communities in the southern Amazon (as well as non-indigenous 
communities) have been able to begin their opposition to oil companies’ destructive activities 
before they enter their territory rather than fighting for remediation after the damage has been 
done. Communities have invoked a wide range of legal protections as well as engaged in 
nonviolent direct action and other political strategies in their resistance, often fitting in with the 
influential indigenous rights movement in Ecuador as a whole. Conflicts between indigenous 
communities and oil companies continue to this day as the government continues to open 
indigenous territory to petroleum production.  
 
 
The Indigenous Movement in Ecuador 
Environmental issues are integrated parts of the indigenous movement as a whole and are 
intimately connected to its fight for land rights, self-determination, and more. Defending natural 
resources and land is one of the central aspects of the mission of the Confederación de 
Nacionalidades indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), the national indigenous political organization 
formed in 1980 (Quienes Somos, 2015), as well as of the Confederación de Nacionalidades 
indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (CONFENIAE), the regional indigenous political 
organization for the Amazon (Quienes Somos). Connecting environmental protection with other 
political demands has been a conscious and effective strategic choice of indigenous organizations 
(Altmann, 2019). This ideological strategy, combined with necessary qualities such as strong 
leadership from CONAIE, national identity, protest, and directed political agendas (Wilkes, 
2006) have likely contributed to its success on the national scene. The indigenous movement has 
had ripple effects in the political and social structure and norms of Ecuador in the last three 
decades. Indigenous issues were inserted into the national political agenda in 1990, when 
CONAIE) organized a massive protest in Quito (Colloredo-Mansfeld, 2009, 80). The broader 
political indigenous movement’s demands for self-determination of indigenous people have since 
then directed the political and social discourse of Ecuador as a whole toward the concept of a 
plurinational state (Altmann, 2015). Protests in various regions, such as the uprising in Puyo in 
1992, kept the pressure on the government to put indigenous issues front and center (Sawyer, 
1997). Organized indigenous people have contributed to the ousting of presidents three times 
when they opposed their leadership (Associated Press, 1997; Rohter, 2000; Forero, 2005). Most 
recently, in 2019, the indigenous movement shut down Quito in protest of the president’s 
decision to end fuel subsidies and were successful in getting the government to accept their 
alternative deal (Collyns, 2019). Understanding more about the indigenous anti-petroleum 
movement, which this paper focuses on, will ​enrich​ studies of the political movement for 
indigenous rights in Ecuador.  
 
Research Question 
Many individual movements led by indigenous people against petroleum in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon have been analyzed by scholars. The case of Aguinda v. Texaco alone 
makes up perhaps the majority of literature on these movements because of its high profile and 
long history. It has been analyzed from the perspective of international law (Kimerling, 2006; 
Payne, 2012), environmental law (Kimerling, 1991; Dhooge, 2010; Patel, 2012), sociology 
(Sanandrés & ​Otálora Montenegro​, 2015), socioecology and political science (Kassar, 2012; 
Ramos, 2000), and anthropology (Sawyer, 2002). In an article focusing on constitutional law, 
Isabela Figueroa examines resistance of Shuar and Sarayaku communities, who used new legal 
structures in Ecuador to protect their rights against petroleum activities, revealing the calculated 
pushback from oil companies and the weakness of the Ecuador legal system (Figueroa, 2006). 
The anthropologist Michael Cepek spent years chronicling the resistance of the Cofan people to 
petroleum in their territory, seeking to understand their perspective on oil (Cepek & ​Guerra​, 
2018), and authors Flora Lu and Nestor Silva studied the Waorani people and how they negotiate 
territorial borders in the context of threats from the oil industry (Lu & Silva, 2015). How the 
Yasunídos campaign used media, democracy, and protest to bring their issue onto the national 
stage was the subject of author Diana Coryat (Coryat et al., 2017), and authors Vallejo and 
 
Duhalde conduct a thorough review of the movement of the Sapara community (Vallejo & 
Duhalde, 2017). However, when it comes to a more comprehensive review of the indigenous-led 
anti-petroleum movement in the Ecuadorian Amazon overall, there is a gap in the literature. In 
an article on indigenous movements in the United States and Canada, author Rima Wilkes points 
out that studies of indigenous political movements tend to focus on individual uprisings (Wilkes, 
2006), and this is certainly true for the literature on Ecuador. This study begins to fill that gap by 
studying several movements together and analyzing the trends between them. The primary 
question this paper asks is: How successful have indigenous-led anti-petroleum movements in 
the Ecuadorian Amazon been overall? What are the most common tactics used by indigenous 
communities to oppose petroleum activities in their territories? And is there a correlation 
between the type of tactics used and the success of the movement?  
 
Objectives and Hypotheses 
Studying the relationship between tactics and success is useful from the perspective of 
movement strategy. Research comparing the many small campaigns within a larger social 
movement can reveal trends that can provide insight into what is and is not working for activists. 
The hope is that these results may be useful to current and future movements endeavoring to 
determine the most effective strategy to win their campaigns. Because of the importance of the 
effort against petroleum to the indigenous movement in Ecuador as a whole, it is hoped that this 
information could be useful in a broader sense as well in terms of indigenous social movements 
in Ecuador.  
The preliminary research summarized in the background section of this proposal, as well 
as prior knowledge, led to a few hypotheses. First, it may be expected that indigenous 
communities use various tactics to protect their land and rights in the face of petroleum 
exploitation, ranging from direct action and physical protest to litigation in both Ecuadorian and 
international courts and negotiating directly with government officials. It seems likely that there 
would be few successes and many continuing efforts due to the strength and capitalist values of 
the Ecuadorian government and oil companies. It may also be expected to see variation in the 
structure of these movements: for some indigenous communities to work alone and others to 
form partnerships with NGOs. Finally, it may be expected for movements that use a combination 
of working with the government and taking matters into their own hands through actions such as 
blockades to have the highest levels of success.  
 
Methods 
This study looked at indigenous-led movements against petroleum activities in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon from the first movement (the earliest with sufficient information available 
began in 1987) to the present day. Methods for this research project were solely internet-based. 
Therefore, the only materials needed were a laptop and access to online resources and databases, 
which was gained through Smith College Libraries. Consulting Professor Xavier Silva and 
advisor Alexandra Almeida, who have experience with anti-petroleum movements, was a 
starting point for finding information in this area. Another first step was to use the Smith College 
Libraries database to search for peer-reviewed articles and the database Access World News to 
search for news articles using broad terms such as “indigenous,” “petroleum or oil,” and 
“movement or resistance.” Once a thorough literature review of the topic was conducted and 
search results for news articles began to become very repetitive, seven movements that had 
 
sufficient information to conduct this analysis were selected. Searches were then narrowed to 
each specific movement to uncover more detailed information. Organization websites and blogs, 
press releases, news articles, resources such as the Global Nonviolent Action Database and 
Environmental Justice Atlas, information from the organization Acción Ecológica provided by 
Alexandra Almeida, peer-reviewed articles, and court documents were used to gather as 
comprehensive as possible understanding of the chronology of each selected movement. In order 
to organize this information, a brief history was written of each movement and they were 
consolidated onto a timeline. An additional timeline of the case of Aguinda v. Texaco 
individually was created to aid in understanding its trajectory because that is the most lengthy 
and complex movement. 
In order to be able to analyze this information, each movement was assigned codes for 
tactics and success which consisted of words or short phrases, a common way to define data in 
qualitative research. An inductive coding method was used: appropriate codes were identified 
based on the information read about the movements regarding what tactics they used in their 
campaigns and how they achieved or did not achieve their various goals. There were nine tactic 
codes and four success codes. Since success codes were rather ambiguous, levels of success were 
also assigned to each movement as a number from 0 (least successful) to 5 (most successful).  
To analyze this data, first a table showing the codes for tactics as well as success for each 
movement was created. A table of the movements that were studied and their respective codes 
was also created. Then, a bar graph showing the number of movements that used each tactic was 
created to visualize how common each tactic was, as well as ​a pie chart showing the percentage 
of movements in the sample that used each tactic​. Next, a pie chart was created depicting the 
percentage of successful movements only that used each tactic. This would have been repeated 
for movements that were unsuccessful, but it was not useful as there was only one. A bar graph 
was also created of the success rate of each tactic​, calculated by percentage of movements that 
used that tactic that were successful. To examine any correlation between the number of different 
types of tactics used during the campaign and the success of a given campaign, a scatter plot was 
created with success rate on the y axis and number of tactics used on the x axis with a trendline 
and R​2​ value.  
Tactics were also organized on a spectrum of more “internal,” meaning more 
institutional, to more “external,” meaning non-institutional. Institutional tactics utilize 
institutional structures and includes actions like meeting with government officials and 
delivering petitions, and non-institutional tactics involve taking action outside institutional 
avenues and include actions like physical blockades of access roads oil companies need to 
operate (Wilkes, 2004). This provided a way to organize the categories of tactics further into 
what type of strategy they fall into. The most internal tactic was assigned the number 1 and 
numbers increased as tactics became more external, up to number 9.  
To assign each campaign a value of how internal or external its strategy was, it was 
assigned the number of the most external of all tactics they used. To examine any correlation 
between how external a tactic was and how successful it was, a scatter plot was created with the 
success rate of the tactic on the y axis (the percentage of movements that used that tactic that 
were successful) and the number on the spectrum from most internal (1) to most external (9) on 
the x axis.  
Additionally, to assign each campaign a value of how varied its strategy was  -- whether 
it used both strategies that were very internal and strategies that were very external or just used 
 
tactics that were very close to each other on the spectrum -- the number on the spectrum of the 
most internal tactic the campaign used was subtracted from the number of the most external 
tactic it used. To examine any correlation between how varied a campaign’s strategy was and 
how successful it was, a scatte​r plot was created with the success level on the y axis and the 
number indicating how varied the tactics were used on the x axis, ​with a trendline and R​2​ value.  
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Tactics that were generally similar were grouped into categories, of which there are nine: 
“Lawsuit,” “Letter,” “Petition,” “Protest,” “Physical Hindrance,” “NGOs,” “Meeting With 
Officials,” “Referendum,” and “Other Legal Action” (Table 1). The code “NGOs” was inspired 
by Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas). The primary codes for success were “Victory” and 
“Loss” (Table 1). For a movement to earn a code of “Victory,” it only had to be successful in at 
least one way; therefore, “successful” movements did not necessarily have all of their demands 
met. Since “Victory” did not necessarily mean complete success, “Repeat Offense” and “Efforts 
Ongoing” help clarify the status of the movement. For example, if a movement has the codes 
“Victory, Repeat Offense, Efforts Ongoing,” it is clear that the campaign is still active because 
although they won, the government or oil company broke the law or agreement, so they have to 
fight against their actions again (such as in the case of the Sarayaku, Table 2). If a movement has 
the codes “Victory, Efforts Ongoing,” it indicates that the movement was not completely 
successful (such as in the case of Aguinda v. Texaco, Table 2), unlike a movement that only has 





Online or on paper; local, regional, national, or 
international 
Victory 
At least part of the campaign’s demands were met 
Referendum 
Gathering signatures for a question to be put to vote 
nationally 
Loss 
None of the campaign’s demands were met 
Lawsuit  
Including lawsuits in any location or level of 
jurisdiction, under any country or other international 
governing body, concerning any aspect of the 
resistance campaign. Includes requesting hearings with 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
regardless of whether it moved to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights 
Efforts Ongoing 
Campaign is still active 
 
Physical Hindrance  
Including activities such as blocking access to site of 
petroleum activities with bodies or materials or by 
destroying infrastructure; seizing company/government 
equipment necessary for petroleum activities; and 
preparing for combat 
Repeated Offense 
Only paired with Victory; though the campaign 
succeeded, the government and/or oil companies later 
repeated the offensive act 
NGOs  
Involvement of national and/or international 




Document sent to government and/or oil companies 
from community and/or collaborating NGOs; includes 
formal proposals/demands and resolutions 
 
Protest 
Public demonstrations such as rallies and marches 
 
Meeting With Officials 
In-person meetings with government officials and/or 
oil company officials/representatives regarding the 
conflict; includes public hearings 
 
Other Legal Action 
Legal action other than lawsuit, such as a legal petition  
 
Table 1. Codes for tactics and success (bolded) with explanation of meaning (unbolded).  
 
When tactics were organized on a spectrum of more “internal” to more “external” tactics, 
“Meeting With Officials” was the most internal strategy, while “Physical Hindrance” was the 
most external (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Spectrum organizing tactics from most internal to most external, each with a value 




All movements used at least three tactics, and the most used by one movement was six by 
the Sápara: “Letter,” “Lawsuit,” “Physical Hindrance,” “Protest,” “NGOs,” and “Meeting With 
Officials” (Table 2). “NGOs” was the most common tactic, used by all seven movements (Figure 
2). “Protest” comes second, used by five movements, and “Lawsuit” and “Physical Hindrance” 
tie for third most common, with each used by four movements (Figure 2). “Letter” is used by 
three movements, “Petition” and “Meeting With Officials” by two, and “Referendum” and 
“Legal Action” are the least common, used by only one movement (Figure 2). All but one 
movement was awarded the code “Victory,” though only two movements avoided both qualifiers 
“Efforts Ongoing” and “Repeated Offense” (Table 2). The only numeric success level that was 
shared by more than one movement was 5, the highest value, which was awarded to the Waorani 
and the Cofan movements (Table 2). Levels 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 were each assigned to one 
movement (Table 2).  
 
Movement Tactics Success 
Aguinda v. Texaco Lawsuit, Protest, NGOs 3; Victory, Efforts Ongoing 
Yasunídos Referendum, Protest, NGOs 0; Loss, Efforts Ongoing 
Sarayaku Lawsuit, Protest, Other Legal 
Action, Physical Hindrance, NGOs 
4; Victory, Repeated Offense, 
Efforts Ongoing 
Waorani Lawsuit, Protest, Petition, Letter, 
NGOs 
5; Victory 
Sápara Lawsuit, Physical Hindrance, 
Letter, Protest, Meeting With 
Officials, NGOs 
2; Victory, Efforts Ongoing 
Sani Isla Petition, Physical Hindrance, NGOs 1; Victory 
Cofan Physical Hindrance, Letter, Meeting 
With Officials, NGOs 
5; Victory, Repeated Offense, 
Efforts Ongoing 
Table 2. Names of movements and respective codes for tactics and success. Numeric success 
levels are indicated before codes under the “Success” column.  
 
NGOs were used by 7 movements (100% of the movements), protests by 5 (71%), 
lawsuits and physical hindrance activities by 4 (57%), letters by 3 (43%), petitions and meetings 




Figure 2. Bar graph showing how many movements used each tactic. 
 
 
Figure 3. Pie chart showing the percentage of movements in the sample that used each tactic. 
 
When only looking at the tactics successful movements used, NGOs remained the only 
tactic used by 100% of movements, but Lawsuit was used by 67% rather than 55% of 
movements (Figure 3). Of movements that filed a lawsuit, 100% were successful; the same is 
true for movements that used letters, petitions, meetings with officials, physical hindrance, and 
other legal action; of those that partnered with NGOs, 86% were successful; of those that used 
protest 75% were successful; and out of those that used a referendum, 0% were successful 




Figure 4. Pie chart showing what percentage of movements with “Victory” code used each tactic. 
Excludes referendum, which was only used by Yasunídos, which has the code “Loss.” 
 
The tactics with the highest success rates were lawsuits, letters, petitions, meetings with 
officials, and other legal action, all which had success rates of 100% (Figure 5). NGOs had a 
success rate of 86%, protests 80%, physical hindrance 75%, and referendums 0% (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Bar graph showing success rate of each tactic. Success rate was calculated by 
percentage of movements that used that tactic that were successful. 
 
In the scatterplot created to identify any correlation between the number of different 
types of tactics used during the campaign and the success of a given campaign, the trendline was 




Figure 6. Scatterplot showing statistical correlation between number of tactics used and success 
rate. Success rate of each number of tactics is the percentage of movements that used that 
number of tactics that were successful. 
 
The scatter plot showing the correlation between how external a tactic was (1 being most 
internal and 9 being most external) and success rate of those tactics has a slight negative 
trendline with an R​2​ value of 0.0041 (Figure 7). The scatter plot showing the correlation between 
how varied the tactics a movement used were and success level of the movement has a positive 
trendline with an R​2​ value of 0.122 (Figure 8).  
  
 
Figure 7. Scatter plot showing correlation between how external a tactic was (measured on the 
spectrum in figure 1) and the success rate of that tactic. Success rate is the percentage of 




Figure 8. Scatter plot showing correlation between how varied the tactics a movement used were 
and the success level of the movement. Tactic variation was calculated for each movement by 
subtracting the number on the spectrum seen in figure 1 of the most internal tactic used from the 
number of the most external tactic used. 
 
Discussion 
Variation in Tactic Type and Number 
There was a great diversity in tactics; there were nine categories, and even within these 
was variation in the type of tactic used. Though they were grouped into categories of similar 
tactics, there were virtually no specific tactics that completely shared characteristics between 
movements, as all had slight variations to fit their circumstances.  
Physical Hindrance 
For example, “Physical Hindrance” is a category that encompasses a wide range of 
tactics. In 1987, the Cofan people occupied the site of oil extraction Texaco was attempting in 
their territory without permission (Cepek & ​Guerra​, 2018, p. 176). After this was successful, to 
prevent Texaco or any other oil company from returning to that place in the future, they 
constructed a village and planted gardens in the path of the access road (Almeida, 2003). Then in 
2000, ​in response to the company Lumbaqui Oil entering Cofan territory, the community 
confiscated their equipment and halted their activities (Almeida, 2003). When they succeeded in 
getting the company to remove the equipment with promises of negotiating a new contract, the 
community destroyed the bridge leading into the area to prevent the company from returning 
(Almeida, 2003). ​Then, in late 2002, as ​Compañía General de Combustibles​ attempted to begin 
seismic exploration, bringing armed forces with them to beat back any opposition, the Sarayaku 
community set up ​“Camps for Peace and Life” in their path, physically protecting their land from 
extraction, for seven months (​Sarayaku). All of these tactics, from occupation to constructing 
villages in the way of roads to seizing company equipment to destroying infrastructure, fell 
under the category of “Physical Hindrance” because they were all ways of directly inhibiting 
company activities through physical obstacles.  
 
Lawsuit 
Even the category “Lawsuit” holds variation in the type of litigation used, the protections 
invoked, and the geographic jurisdiction. For example, in 1993, Aguinda v. Texaco was filed in 
the United States first but moved to Ecuador in 2002, and after the decision in favor of the 
plaintiffs in Ecuador they explored avenues in other countries such as Argentina and Canada to 
collect from Chevron (Texaco​/Chevron Lawsuits, 2019). In 2002, the Sarayaku lodged a petition 
with the ​Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and succeeded in holding the 
government of Ecuador responsible for their violations of indigenous rights ​(The Case Of The 
Kichwa, 2012). In 2019, the Waorani filed a lawsuit against the Ecuadorian Ministry of Energy 
and Non-Renewable Natural Resources, the Secretary of Hydrocarbons, and the Ministry of 
Environment invoking protections of indigenous rights from both Ecuadorian and international 
law (Amazon Frontlines, 2019a). All of these fell under the category of “Lawsuit” but take 
different forms. Though it may seem as though filing a lawsuit is a fairly predetermined path to 
follow, the specific avenues the plaintiffs explored were not necessarily the only ones available 
to them in their particular situation. For example, the Waorani may also have been able to appeal 
to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, but it would likely have resulted in a much longer 
timeline: their case was wrapped up in a matter of months, even including the appeals process 
the Ecuadorian Ministry of Energy and Non-renewable Resources initiated (Amazon Frontlines, 
2019c), while the Sarayaku case took a decade to move through the international system, during 
which time the community dealt with repeated violations of their rights by ​the Ecuadorian 
government and CGC (Lawrence, 2010; Case Of The Kichwa, 2012).  
Correlations Between Tactics and Success 
The variation within each movement of the type of tactics it used is particularly 
interesting. The scatter plot examining the correlation between how varied a movement’s tactics 
were and how successful it is has a positive trendline (Figure 8). This seems to show that the 
more varied the tactics, the higher rate of success. In other social movements, a varied approach 
has been shown to be most effective. For example, Fabio Rojas finds that students advocating for 
change at universities have greater success when their tactic styles allow the administration to act 
on behalf of protestors (Rojas, 2006). Applying these dynamics to indigenous movements 
advocating for change against the government that is allowing oil companies to enter their 
territory, it seems likely that combining external tactics with internal ones would be most 
effective because protests and actions such as blockades are done with the intention to put public 
pressure on the government to say yes to the demands set out through an institutional pathway 
such as a formal petition, letter, or lawsuit, giving the government an easy path to act on their 
behalf. For example, Yasunídos participated in demonstrations at the same time as they collected 
signatures to be able to put their referendum to vote (Medallasa), which likely increased public 
knowledge about the issue from their point of view, likely increasing the number of signatures 
they would be able to gather as well as the number of people who would vote in their favor if the 
referendum was put to a vote. Using a combination of internal and external tactics is a common 
strategy not only among the movements studied but also in other countries. For example, in one 
of the most high-profile indigenous environmental movements in United States history, the 
largely successful campaign against the Dakota Access Pipeline, Standing Rock Sioux activists 
used a combination of internal and external tactics ranging from meetings with officials to 
occupations of the site (DAPL Resistance, 2016). Additionally, physically blocking an oil 
company from entering often merely slows the company’s activities down, which may be 
 
effective in protecting the territory in the meantime while urging the government to back their 
position. For example, the Sarayaku community occupied the area in which the oil company 
Compañía General de Combustibles was attempting to work (Sarayaku), which prevented the 
company from entering their territory while they filed a petition with Pujo Provincial 
Ombudsman, who then authorized a Declaration of Protection that ordered CGC to cease their 
activities (Lawrence, 2010). ​However, the R​2​ value of the trendline is very small, indicating that 
the correlation found is most likely due to chance and therefore prohibiting such conclusions to 
be drawn from this data.  
Looking at individual tactic success rates rather than combinations, there is a slight 
negative correlation between how external the tactic is and the tactic’s success rate (Figure 7). 
This indicates that more internal tactics have higher success rates. However, given the results on 
the combination of tactics being effective, this finding seems to hold less weight. Additionally, 
the R​2​ value is very small and therefore insignificant, indicating that this correlation is due to 
chance. The only two tactics that had both a high success rate and a large number of movements 
that used them were lawsuits and physical hindrance activities (Table 2; Figure 5). Therefore, 
these are the two tactics whose high success rate was most significant, and two tactics are not 
enough to examine a correlation between how internal or external a tactic is and its success.  
A slightly more interesting result is the positive trendline in the scatter plot examining the 
correlation between the number of tactics and the movement’s success (Figure 6). This indicates 
that the more tactics movements used, the more successful they were. The R​2​ value, which was 
greater than 0.5 indicates that this correlation is statistically significant. ​More tactics used could 
indicate that a campaign is larger and stronger, giving it a higher chan​ce of success. Again 
comparing to the Standing Rock campaign, activists there engaged in numerous tactics -- a 
lawsuit, a petition, marches, meetings with officials, blockades, and occupations (DAPL 
Resistance, 2016). However, it would be foolish to accept these results as significant due to the 
small sample size. For example, there was only one movement that used four tactics and one 
movement that used six, and they happened to be successful (Table 2), leading to the values of 
100% success rate for mov​ements that used those numbers of tactics (Figure 6). Yasunídos was 
the only unsuccessful movement, and it happened to use only three tactics (Table 2); it cannot be 
said with certainty that the small number of tactics it used contributed to its failure.  
 
Most Common Tactics 
NGOs 
The universal use of NGOs to aid in resistance efforts is most notable when identifying 
which tactics were most common. The fact that NGO partnerships were ubiquitous contradicts 
the hypothesis that there would be variation in whether movements worked alone or with others. 
The fact that all movements had some sort of partnership with an official organization indicates 
that NGOs are useful resources to indigenous communities, which is unsurprising given the fact 
that they provide resources such as publicity and strategy assistance at no cost. In several of the 
movements examined, NGOs amplified the community’s struggle by taking it onto the 
international stage. For example, Avaaz launched the Sani Isla petition online (Watts, 2013b), 
Amazon Watch provided the Waorani with a platform to share their campaign (Our Land is Not 
for Sale), and CONAIE and CONFENIAE backed countless movements, amplifying their efforts 
and connecting them to the broader indigenous movement in Ecuador (See Appendix A). In a 
visit our program had with the community Loma del Tigre, one of the Kichwa communities 
 
involved in UDAPT, residents mentioned that they were working on starting the website, which 
was difficult for them to do on their own because of lack of WiFi access in the village. NGOs 
can provide valuable resources to indigenous groups that do not have access to forms of 
communication most common in media such as the internet.  
Protest and Physical Hindrance 
The second most popular tactic after NGO collaboration was “Protest,” followed by 
“Physical Hindrance” (Figure 3). In fact, every movement used either one or the other (Table 2). 
This is unsurprising given the results that showed that combining internal tactics with external 
ones was an effective strategy. However, it is also important to note that physically protecting 
their territory was sometimes the last resort for indigenous groups who the government refused 
to support rather than just a strategic move to support an internal tactic. This happened to the 
Sani Isla people, who prepared to fight any oil company officials who entered their territory 
(Watts, 2013a) and is mirrored in indigenous resistance around the world. For example, an 
indigenous movement that has used occupation as its central tactic to protect their ancestral land 
is the months-long occupation of Mauna Kea in Hawaii (Broder Van Dyke, 2019).  
Lawsuit 
“Lawsuit” tied “Physical Hindrance” for next most common after protests (Figure 3). The 
popularity of lawsuits is unsurprising given the protections for indigenous peoples that are 
ingrained into Ecuadorian law as well as international law that Ecuador is bound by. Lawsuits 
are perhaps also an appealing route because if they are won, the government is obliged to enforce 
the decision, protecting that community’s rights for the foreseeable future. This sense of security 
in the protection of a court ruling was clear in the Waorani’s declaration of victory after their 
2019 lawsuit ​(Amazon Frontlines, 2019c)​. It is also easy to find examples of other indigenous 
communities using lawsuits to fight oil companies in other countries. Just last month, the latest 
development in the indigenous-led fight against the Keystone XL Pipeline occurred when the 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe filed for a restraining order against President Trump to halt construction of 
the pipeline (Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Donald J. Trump, 2020). Also notable is that all the 
movements in this sample that used lawsuits were at least partially successful. This was also true 
for four other codes, but lawsuits were used by more movements than those, making it slightly 
more significant. This indicates that Ecuadorian courts may be likely to recognize and punish the 
actions of the government when it does not abide by its own laws. However, this conclusion 
cannot be definitively drawn due to the small sample size, and more importantly, “partially” 
remains the key word: even after the Sarayaku won their case in 2012, for example, the 
Ecuadorian government seemed to ignore the verdict and entered their territory with an oil 
company three years later (Amazon WAtch, 2015a).  
 
Success 
Difficulties in Defining Success 
It is important to note, when looking at the success rate of tactics or level of success of 
movements, that success proved difficult to measure and labels were not perfect. All except one 
movement found success in at least one way (Table 2), but very few had a definitive and 
complete victory. It was often even difficult to decide whether to code a movement as a victory 
or a loss. For example, Yasunídos gathered sufficient signatures for a referendum, but due to 
government fraud they were not accepted (Medallas). It was tempting to call that a victory 
because they gathered enough signatures and may have succeeded in the absence of fraud, but it 
 
was more accurately a loss because in the end they were not able to get the referendum put to a 
vote. This presents an issue when attempting to correlate success with tactics. The loss was not 
necessarily because it was an ineffective tactic but rather because of the government’s success in 
committing fraud. Because their main tactic was a referendum, however, labeling it as a loss may 
make it appear as if the public voted no, when in reality it remains untested what the opinion of 
the majority of Ecuadorians is. Another example of this challenge can be found in Aguinda v. 
Texaco. The plaintiffs won their case in Ecuador, but Chevron never paid and now one of the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers is on house arrest (North, 2020). It is marked as a victory here because 
Ecuador’s courts ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but in reality Chevron still has not been held 
accountable. 
High Success Levels Overall 
Despite these challenges, it is very notable that all but one of the movements in this 
sample were at least partially successful. This may seem to indicate that the indigenous 
anti-petroleum movement overall in the Ecuadorian Amazon is a successful one, going against 
the hypothesis that levels of success would be low. However, the sample size is not large enough 
to say this with certainty. The high levels of success in this particular sample size may be largely 
related to the criteria used to select them: available information. Only movements that have 
information about them online were able to be analyzed, and for information to be available on 
the internet means that the movement gained some sort of international attention. Publicity may 
be a deciding factor in a movement’s outcome because of the pressure put on the government 
and oil companies by outsiders’ attention to the issue. The lack of variation in whether 
movements were coded with “Victory” or “Loss” makes it unwise to give weight to any 
relationship that has been discovered between tactics and success. The tactics used may have 
impacted the movements’ success, but it is not possible to know for sure given the very small 
sample size.  
 
Backlash  
Though many movements were labeled as victorious, an important aspect to highlight is 
that this success was almost always conditional, due to the fact that many movements did not get 
all of their demands met or that petroleum activities once again threatened their livelihoods after 
they had once succeeded in shutting them out. Corruption and disregard for the law and the 
rights of indigenous peoples on the part of both the government and the oil companies were 
rampantly common, leading to communities having to maintain vigilance against violations of 
their rights.  
Government Response 
The government response to these movements was seldom in favor of indigenous 
communities. Though Ecuador has been a pioneer in some respects, granting rights to nature 
(Kauffman & Martin, 2018), ratifying human rights treaties (American Convention), and 
including indigenous rights in the constitution (Constitución, 2008), when it comes to oil 
corporations versus indigenous rights, it almost always chooses corporations. The countless 
examples of the government’s actions in response to community opposition to oil activities range 
from ignoring the community’s wishes to using violence. As early as 1987, when the Cofan first 
opposed Texaco’s activities in their territory, the company warned the community that they had 
the military behind them and could use force to continue their activities despite community 
opposition (Cepek & ​Guerra​, 2018, pp. 178-179). In more recent years, the government did 
 
nothing to stop Petroecuador from attempting to manufacture consent from the community 
(Almeida, 2003), despite the fact that it had accepted the Cofan’s proposal against 
Petroecuador’s activities ​(Cepek & Guerra, 2018, p. 184​). In 2002, when ​Compañía General de 
Combustibles​ was found illegally operating on Sarayaku territory after the community was 
granted a ​Declaration of Protection, the government took the company’s side and used military 
force against the community (Lawrence, 2010). ​Then three years after the 2012 decision in favor 
of the Sarayaku, the government ignored the ruling and re-entered their territory (Amazon 
Watch, 2015a). When Yasunídos attempted to get their referendum in 2014, the government 
clearly went to lengths to prevent the signatures from being verified, first by confusing citizens 
into signing the wrong form and then by breaking the chain of custody of the final submitted 
signatures (​Medallas)​. Most recently, the government attempted to throw a wrench in the 
Waorani lawsuit against them by initially holding the hearing in a place inaccessible to the 
community and assigning a judge that discriminated against them (Amazon Frontlines, 2019b). 
Then after the court decision in favor of the Waorani, the ​Ministry of Energy and Non-renewable 
Natural Resources promptly appealed it (Ministerio de Energía, 2019).  
This trend is not only present in this particular set of movements but in indigenous 
environmental movements in Ecuador overall.​ An extreme but representative example can be 
found in 2016, when Ecuadorian police attacked CONFENIAE headquarters. At 5:00 in the 
morning, while residents were sleeping, the police undertook a violent siege of the headquarters 
in an attempt to force the election of a government-allied man to the organization’s leadership 
(Cerda, 2016). Other indigenous activists have faced inhumane treatment and harsh sentences 
from the criminal justice system in Ecuador for daring to voice their opposition to corporate 
extractivism (Amazon Watch, 2016). These trends were confirmed by the Special Rapporteur on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples during her visit to Ecuador in 2018: her report found that 
though the constitution established a good framework for ensuring indigenous rights, the 
government’s actions regarding petroleum extraction among other activities did not align with its 
promise to ensure the rights of indigenous peoples to their land (United Nations, 2019). Hostility 
on the part of the government is also echoed in the experience of indigeous organizers of social 
movements for similar indigenous rights in North America: for example, the American Indian 
Movement was forced to disassemble because of a concerted, clandestine effort in opposition to 
it by the FBI (Wilkes, 2006).  
Oil Company Response 
In addition to the government itself fighting against indigenous movements, the 
despicable actions corporations took in order to weaken local resistance to their activities were 
present in essentially every movement studied in this paper. They were present in the case of 
Aguinda v. Texaco, when Texaco succeeded in creating rifts between the indigenous-based 
organization UDAPT and the original organization Frente (A. Almeida, personal 
communication, April 20, 2020); in the case of the Cofan community, in years following 
Lumbaqui Oil’s attempt to infiltrate their territory (Almeida, 2003); in the Sarayaku community, 
when ​Compañía General de Combustibles​ pretended to withdraw but continued working on their 
land secretly ​(Lawrence, 2010)​ and then again when the company attempted to divide the 
community and gain consent from some individuals (Lawrence, 2010); and when Petroamazonas 
signed a contract with the chief of the Sani Isla community without wider community consent 
(Watts, 2013a) ​and when resistance was clearly still strong went knocking on doors to divide the 
community (Robinson, 2014). Unfortunately, in the case of the Sani Isla community, this 
 
strategy worked (​A. Almeida, personal communication, April 29, 2020).​ This despicable practice 
is common across oil companies working in the Ecuadorian Amazon. So-called “community 
liaisons” have become infamous within indigenous communities as employees of petroleum 
companies whose mission is to manufacture consent and silence resistance to their activities 
through either deceit or the manufacturing of intra-community conflicts to divide indigenous 
political organizations (Figueroa, 2006). The devel​opment of “community relations” practices by 
oil companies as a defensive strategy in response to resistance is not limited to Ecuador. A 2018 
article on a pro-pipeline website covering North America quoted an “indigenous relations 
liaison” at the pipeline company TransCanada saying the company could have avoided 
indigenous resistance by “partnering” with indigenous groups in the affected area before 
construction began (Kramer, 2018).  
 
Conclusion 
Summary of Findings 
This study indicates that the most popular tactic used by indigenous movements against 
petroleum in the Ecuadorian Amazon is partnerships with NGOs, followed by protests second 
and lawsuits and then physical hindrance tactics tied for third. Findings also indicate that these 
movements have a very high level of success overall. There were no statistically significant 
correlations found between how internal or external a tactic was and its success rate or between 
how varied the tactics a movement used were and that movement’s success level, but there was a 
slightly significant positive correlation found between the number of tactics used and the success 
rate of using that number of tactics. None of these findings can be assumed to apply to 
indigenous anti-petroleum movements in this region overall, however, due to the prohibitively 
small sample size.  
Among other general trends in the movements studied, all movements chosen gained 
relatively wide publicity, whether through the news or the websites of partner organizations, a 
characteristic which likely was related to the tactics they used and impacted their success. 
Additionally, there were similarities in the types of responses the movements prompted from the 
oil companies they opposed as well as from the Ecuadorian government. Oil companies 
generally engaged in covert, strategic plans to tamp down resistance or continue their operations 
despite opposition, and the Ecuadorian government consistently took the side of corporations, 
likely because of their economic dependence on petroleum production due in large part to their 
debt to China, and often used force to suppress community opposition. It is also clear that these 
trends are consistent with realities of indigenous resistance to oil and gas activities in North 
America. 
 
Importance of Findings 
These findings are a step in the direction of more fully understanding the indigenous 
anti-petroleum movement in Ecuador. Comparing and analyzing the trends between several 
indigenous-led anti-petroleum movements in the Ecuadorian Amazon in one paper is something 
that has not previously been done, and it proves a useful resource as a starting place for those 
wishing to investigate this topic in the future. Such study holds important insights for current and 
future activists. The findings may indicate to future movements which tactics may be most 
effective; if it is possible to make the analyses more statistically significant with a larger sample 
size, this may be a valuable resource to future activists. It also yields information useful to those 
 
studying the indigenous rights movement as a whole in Ecuador. Indigenous communities 
defending their territory from oil companies do not always gain as much attention as political 
protests in the nation’s capital because the contested issue is intimately connected to the land and 
takes place in the rainforest. But they share ideology as well as supporting organizations such as 
CONAIE, and it is therefore useful to study the many smaller branches of indigenous rights 
efforts in Ecuador in order to study the whole. Finally, though this study is limited to indigenous 
anti-petroleum movements in the Ecuadorian Amazon, these findings may also contain useful 
insights for studies on the strategies of many other types of movements, social or political, 
related to the environment or not, indigenous-led or not, in Ecuador or in other countries.  
 
Limitations 
The small sample size of this study is its most jarring limitation, resulting in the 
statistically insignificant results. This was largely due to limitations in the methods: primarily, 
the time constraints of this short-term project as well as the dearth of information available 
online about the histories of these movements. Since this study only used information available 
online, as well as some documents from the organization Acción Ecológica, shared by Alexandra 
Almeida, difficulties in finding complete information on the movements resulted in only seven 
movements being thoroughly examined. Additionally, of the movements that were studied, 
information may still have been incomplete. It is very possible that some of the movements also 
used other tactics that were not recorded online and therefore that the summary of what tactics 
each movement used is not complete.  
 
Suggestions for Future Studies 
Future studies would ideally incorporate more movements; a larger sample size would 
reap more significant results. To do this, it would likely be necessary to conduct interviews with 
people involved in the movements and the organizations that partnered with communities, in 
order to gather information that is not available publicly. In addition to repeating this type of 
study with a larger sample size, comparisons between indigenous anti-petroleum movements in 
Ecuador and indigenous movements against similar fossil fuel infrastructure and activities in 
North America would also be an interesting avenue to explore more thoroughly. It would be 
valuable to study similarities and differences in tactics and success levels to see how the political 
and social structures in the different countries impact which strategies are most effective for 
indigenous environmental movements. It is important to acknowledge the effects of political 
climate, social structure, and government structure on the outcome of movements as well as the 
tactics and strategy used. The strategy is crucial, but it is not the only deciding factor in a 
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